FDI in Emerging Economies: An analysis in a firm heterogeneity model by ITO Koji
%1
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 11-E-055
FDI in Emerging Economies:
An analysis in a firm heterogeneity model
ITO Koji
RIETI
The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/ 
1 













In recent years, Japanese manufacturers in both competitive and less competitive sectors have 
penetrated emerging economies, and sales in 2008 by Japanese affiliates established via foreign 
domestic investment (FDI) exceeded Japan’s revenues from exports. To consider this 
phenomenon and the significance of FDI for emerging economies, this study constructs a 
two-country model featuring two factors of production, two industries (with different factor 
intensities), and firm heterogeneity. Thereafter, the study numerically analyzes trends in FDI by 
industry and examines how the economies of both countries are affected.   
Results of the analysis show that highly productive firms favor FDI. That is true whether 
their industries make intensive use of a scarce factor of production or use a more abundant 
factor intensively. 
Compared to the situation in which only export is possible, FDI increases competition 
among firms in both industries. Real wages and welfare increase as a result. On the other hand, 
low-productivity firms are forced to exit, and the number of firms decreases. This analysis also 
shows that FDI could work to help prevent a decline in real revenues of industries that make 
intensive use of a scarce factor of production. 
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In the present era, emerging economies, including Asian economies, are grow-
ing rapidly, and Japanese ﬁrms aggressively seek new markets among them.
Between 2001 and 2007, the growth rate of Japanese foreign direct investment
(FDI) exceeded export growth, and sales by Japanese foreign subsidiaries
substantially exceeded Japanese exports in 2008 (Figure 1). 1 2 Second, this
trend is evident among competitive sectors, such as electronics and trans-
portation, and among less competitive sectors, such as clothing, food, and
agriculture. 3
Does the increase of FDI in emerging economies improve Japan’s eco-
nomic welfare? What signiﬁcance does it have for Japan’s economy? This
study addresses these questions.
Current theoretical models for FDI are inadequate to analyze the fact
that FDI and export are occurring simultaneously across multiple sectors
of Japanese manufacturing. The standard vertical FDI model since Help-
man (1984) consists of two countries, two factors of production (skilled and
unskilled labor), and two goods (one more skill-intensive than the other).
Helpman considered monopolistic competition in the market for diﬀerenti-
ated goods. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, if distribution of factor endow-
ments is remarkably biased between countries factor prices equalization is
1This trend is obvious not merely for Japanese manufacturing but for the Japanese
industry as a whole. According to the Bank of Japan “Balance of Payments,” cumulative
Japanese FDI, which was 39.6 trillion yen at the end of 2001, increased by 56.1 % to
61.7 trillion yen at the end of 2008. Sales by foreign subsidiaries increased rapidly. Data
from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry “Basic Survey on Overseas Business
Activities” shows that sales of foreign subsidiaries in 2007 were 236.2 trillion yen, 2.8 times
greater than exports of 83.9 trillion yen. The growth rate in sales of foreign subsidiaries
between 2001 and 2007 was 9.8 % yearly compared with 9.4 % yearly growth in exports.
2Japan’s FDI in emerging economies is increasing remarkably. According to the Min-
istry of Economy, Trade, and Industry “Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities,”
sales by Japanese ﬁrms’ foreign subsidiaries in Asia grew from 20.3 trillion yen in 2001 to
49.2 trillion yen in 2007. The increase is remarkable compared to sales by Japanese ﬁrms’
foreign subsidiaries in the U.S. and Europe.
3Even in non-manufacturing, generally considered less competitive than Japanese
manufacturing, ﬁrms are starting business in emerging markets. FDI of Japanese non-
manufacturing industries increased 46.4 % from 3,049 billion yen in 2005 to 4,462 billion
yen in 2008. The growth rate exceeds that of FDI of Japanese manufacturers (36.0 % ,
from 7,311 billion yen in 2005 to 9,944 billion yen in 2008). Among the composition of
the Japanese FDI forward Asia in 2008, wholesale and retail (1,543 billion yen) is third,
behind electric machines and appliances (2,345 billion yen) and vehicles and appliance
(2,076 billion yen).
1not obtained. However, Helpman divides the operations of the skill-intensive
industry in the skill-abundant country into headquarters and production and
shows that factor prices are equalized by shifting production toward the for-
eign country which has an abundant unskilled labor.
In these “vertical FDI models,” the sharp diﬀerence in factor endowments
between two countries generates FDI, and the model works well to explain
conventional cases - for example, ﬁrms in developed economies close a do-
mestic factory and open a factory in a developing economy where wages are
low. 4
Today, however, FDI by Japanese manufacturers transcends this model’s
usefulness. As we see, ﬁrms in the comparatively disadvantaged sector also
invest in emerging economies. In addition, many Japanese manufacturing
ﬁrms recognize Asian economies not only as a base of production and ex-
porting but also as a market. 5 That mode of FDI requires a diﬀerent
theoretical model.
Markusen and Venables (1998) established the theoretical model for such
cases of “horizontal FDI.” 6 Their model also features two countries, two
production factors, and two goods. But their horizontal model diﬀers from
the vertical model in two respects: it recognizes that trade entails costs, and
it accommodates demand. They analyze multinational ﬁrms and domestic
ﬁrms (the former grow foreign business via FDI and pay attendant ﬁxed costs;
the latter grow foreign business by export and pay transport variable costs.
They show that when (a) consumer demand in both countries is large, (b)
both countries’ factor endowments and technology (factor prices narrow) tend
to be similar, and (c) the variable cost of exporting is higher, multinational
ﬁrms becomes more dominant.
The horizontal FDI model is convenient for analyzing FDI between ad-
vanced countries at similar economic levels. 7 However, economic levels and
4It previously was thought that Japanese FDI in emerging economies has mainly been
vertical FDI. Hayakawa and Matsuura (2009) calculated each sector’s share of vertical
FDI subsidiaries (subsidiaries with less than a 50 % of local sales share) in three areas
(North America, Europe and Asia), using micro data from Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry “Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities.” In 1999, the shares of vertical
FDI in North America and Europe, where Japanese ﬁrms mainly invest, were around 20
%. On the other hand, the shares of FDI in Asian countries were 40 - 60 %.
5For example, Kokusai Kyouryoku Ginkou (2009) surveyed Japanese manufacturers’
opinions concerning which foreign countries are most promising and why. The results
showed China, India, Vietnam, and Thailand are promising. “Expectation for future
growth of the local market” was the most popular answer.
6Markusen (2002) shows the details concerning vertical models. Feenstra (2004) ex-
plains the outline of theories of multinational ﬁrms such as vertical and horizontal FDI.
7Many researchers recognize that FDI by U.S. ﬁrms is mainly horizontal. For example,
2factor endowments diﬀer between advanced economies like Japan and the
emerging economies in which Japanese ﬁrms invest.
Therefore, in this study, I focus on the “ﬁrm heterogeneity” approach
that is now mainstream in trade research. In this approach, productivity
of ﬁrms is the key factor that inﬂuences ﬁrms’ decisions to access foreign
markets. Following this approach, Helpman et al. (2004) expanded Melitz
(2003), who treated only exports, and built a model in which ﬁrms can choose
between export and FDI. They show theoretically that higher-productivity
ﬁrms choose FDI over export. 8 9 Several ﬁrm heterogeneity models, includ-
ing Helpman et al. (2004), attempt to clarify conditions under which ﬁrms
prefer export or FDI. However, these models usually consist of one product
and one production factor; therefore, few consider traditional questions such
as which goods should be exported or how factors should be allocated be-
tween industries. However, these issues gradually have come to be considered
in models of ﬁrm heterogeneity. In one of the ﬁrst papers investigating this
issue, Bernard et al. (2007) expanded Melitz (2003) into a two-goods and
two-factor model and analyzed theoretically the eﬀect of trade liberalization
given diﬀerences in factor endowments.
The results of Bernard et al. (2007) are as follows. 10 After the open-
by using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce,
Blonigen (2005) reveals that 67.4 % of foreign sales of U.S. multinational ﬁrms are from
local markets and, therefore, horizontal FDI is dominant.
Many empirical tests also reveal that FDI by U.S. ﬁrms ﬁts the conclusions of horizontal
FDI models. For example, Carr et al. (2001) empirically examined what variables aﬀect
sales of U.S. multinationals. They found that the amount of GDP of both U.S. and
invested countries has a positive eﬀect, and the diﬀerence of GDP has a negative eﬀects.
Brainard (1997) also shows empirically that foreign sales of U.S. multinational ﬁrms are
larger when GDPs of the U.S. and the invested countries are similar.
Opinions diﬀer about the eﬀects of varying factor endowments and technologies between
countries on U.S. FDI. Carr et al. (2001) found that the skill diﬀerence (diﬀerences in the
ratio of skilled labor to total labor) between the U.S. and invested countries has a positive
eﬀect on the sales of multinational ﬁrms (This result supports the knowledge capital model
in which vertical and horizontal FDI coexist). Blonigen et al. (2003) conducted the same
empirical research as Carr et al. (2001), but replaced the skill diﬀerence with the diﬀerence
in average years of study and showed that its coeﬃcient is negative (thereby supporting
the horizontal FDI model).
8Recently, results of the ﬁrm heterogeneity model have been conﬁrmed empirically. See
Bernard et al. (2007) concerning U.S. ﬁrms and Wakasugi et al. (2008) and Todo (2009)
concerning Japanese ﬁrms. These investigations clarify that only a few ﬁrms account for a
large share of exports and FDI, and that ﬁrms which export or invest in foreign countries
have greater productivity and are larger than other ﬁrms.
9Helpman (2006) surveyed ﬁrms’ choices of exporting or FDI in the economy with ﬁrm
heterogeneity of productivity.
10In Bernard et al. (2007), goods of comparatively advantaged means goods which are
produced by using a scarce factor intensively, and trade entails ﬁxed costs and iceberg-form
variable costs.
3ing of trade, high-productivity ﬁrms, even in comparatively disadvantaged
industries, choose to export. Hence, there is intra-industry trade in both
industries. By the start of trade, the expected increase in revenue of the
comparatively advantaged industry is larger than that of the comparatively
disadvantaged industry. Therefore, competition in the comparatively advan-
taged industry intensiﬁes, and its zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity increases. 11
12 The industries’ demand for factors of production also increases, and the
increased use of the relatively abundant factor by the comparatively advan-
taged industry is larger than that of other factors. This also causes the level
of zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity to increase for the comparatively advan-
taged industry. In a steady state, it is larger than the increase of zero-proﬁt
cutoﬀ productivity of the comparatively disadvantaged industry.
With regard to the expected proﬁt in a foreign country, the comparatively
advantaged industry expects to earn greater proﬁts in a foreign country than
does the comparatively disadvantaged industry.
Hence, more ﬁrms in the comparatively advantaged industry seek to ex-
port, and export cutoﬀ productivity decreases further. As a result, the dif-
ference of zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity and export cutoﬀ productivity is
smaller in the comparatively advantaged industry than in the comparatively
disadvantaged industry, by trade. That is, the fewer ﬁrms enters, but the
share of exporting ﬁrms in enterging ﬁrms increases more in the compara-
tively advantaged industry. However, as trade liberalizes, total real revenue
of both advantaged and disadvantaged industries increases, but the real rev-
enue of the comparatively disadvantaged industry decreases. That is, the real
revenue of the comparatively advantaged industry increases and improves the
wealth of a country.
Bernard et al. (2007) revealed these results by building a theoretical
model and presenting a special numerical example in which wages of both
countries are symmetric. 13 However, they consider only export, not FDI.
Therefore, this study adds FDI to their model and analyzes the behavior of
exporting and FDI, and analyzes the welfare eﬀect of FDI if both countries
allow FDI in addition to export. 14
11We refer to the level of productivity at which a ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt as “zero-proﬁt
cutoﬀ productivity.” All ﬁrms with productivity above this level can produce, and no ﬁrm
with lower productivity can produce.
12This means a greater decrease in the number of entering ﬁrms.
13“Symmetric” indicates that the ratio of skilled/unskilled labor in the home country
is the same as the ratio of unskilled/skilled labor in foreign country, and the factor price
ratio of relatively abundant/scarce factor is the same in both countries.
14We can say this task is an enlargement of Helpman (2004) to a two-goods and two-
factor model.
4The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 builds the theoretical
model. Section 3 considers the eﬀect of FDI. Section 4 presents the numerical
analysis. Section 5 concludes and considers the implications of Japanese ﬁrms
increasing their FDI in emerging economies. 15
2 Model
This study introduces FDI into the model of Bernard et al. (2007). 16 Con-
sider a global economy consisting of two countries, two industries, and two
factors of production. Both countries have two industries: the ﬁrst employs
skilled labor intensively, and the second employs unskilled labor intensively.
The home country (a developed economy, indexed by H) has a relatively
abundant supply of skilled labor, and the foreign country (an emerging econ-
omy, indexed by F) has a relative abundance of unskilled labor. In both in-
dustries, ﬁrms with heterogeneous productivity produce diﬀerentiated goods.
2.1 Consumption
Consumers gain utility by consuming products of industries that intensively
employ skilled or unskilled labor. Suppose the utility function of the repre-







α2, 0 < αi < 1 (1)
i (i = 1,2) means an index of industry (product). That is, 1 represents a
skilled-labor-intensive product and 2 represents an unskilled-labor-intensive
product. α1 + α2 = 1. CH
i is an index of consumed products produced by
industry i, which consists of a diﬀerentiated product qH
i (ω) produced by each












15There is no existing research which uses two-country ﬁrm heterogeneity model with
two factors of production and two industries. Hence, in Section 2, I refer to the eﬀect
of market size of two countries on FDI (which is related to the reason why we reject the
adoption of the horizontal FDI model) and industry or industries where FDI is seen (which
is related to the reason why we reject the adoption of the vertical FDI model).
16FDI is investment behavior and entails an accumulation of capital stock. However,
much existing research regards FDI as a sale of foreign subsidiaries that was previously
established via FDI, dismissing the formation of capital stock. In this paper, I follow this
idea.
5where σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution across
diﬀerentiated goods. P H
i , a price index of products produced by industry i is















Second, we consider production activities in each country. There are two
inputs: skilled and unskilled labor. Suppose the total endowments of skilled
and unskilled labor in country H are ¯ SH and ¯ LH, respectively, and ¯ SF and
¯ LF in country F. Since country H has comparatively more skilled labor and
country F comparatively more unskilled labor, that means ¯ SH/¯ LH > ¯ SF/¯ LF.
17
In this model, each ﬁrm must pay ﬁxed entry costs by employing skilled











ei > 0 (4)
where wH
S and wH
L are the wages of skilled and unskilled labor in country H.
Each ﬁrm does not know its productivity before entering a foreign market.
Only after entering does it discover its productivity, which is stochastically
distributed.
After entering, each ﬁrm decides (a) whether it produces or not, and (b)
whether it enter a foreign market or not, considering its productivity and
following several costs.
When a ﬁrm produces a good, it has to pay production costs. In this
model, production costs consist of a ﬁxed and a variable cost. Fixed costs
of each ﬁrm in an industry are identical. Variable cost is a function of each























1¡βi, 1 > β1 > β2 (5)
Suppose industrial factor intensities, β1 and β2, are common in both countries
and β1 > β2 (that is, industry 1 is more intensive with respect to skilled
labor). fH
i (> 0) is a factor of ﬁxed cost.
17In the following sections, as per Bernard et al. (2007), I refer to products produced
using the comparatively abundant (scarce) factor intensively, “comparatively advantaged
(disadvantaged) products.”
6A ﬁrm can enter a foreign market by export or via FDI, but it must pay
additional costs. When exporting, a ﬁrm also must pay iceberg-style variable














The common ﬁxed factor for each ﬁrm, fH
ix, is larger than fH
i . I assume the
standard icedberg-style variable transport cost. That is, τi (> 1) units are
needed to export one unit of product to a foreign market.
When a ﬁrm enters a foreign market via FDI, it must pay the ﬁxed cost
















The common ﬁxed factor of FDI, fH
ia, is larger than fH
ix and a function of
wages in the foreign country.
Taking account of its productivity, costs of production, export, and FDI,
etc., each ﬁrm examines its production alternatives. Firms have four choices:
(a) no production, (b) produce only for the domestic market, (c) produce for
domestic and export markets, and (d) produce in both countries. Productiv-
ity diﬀers for each ﬁrm. Therefore, not all ﬁrms enter the foreign market by
exporting or FDI. Some ﬁrms choose not to enter the foreign market at all.
As in the usual ﬁrm heterogeneity models, suppose that ﬁrms in each
industry compete in monopolistically competitive markets. As a result of
proﬁt maximization, each ﬁrm sets its price as follows. First, the price for
country H by a ﬁrm in industry i, pH












Considering ﬁxed and variable costs of exporting, the price of exporting

























Given the prices established above, a ﬁrm’s revenue from its domestic

















7RH is the total wages of domestic consumers.






















































Finally, proﬁts from the domestic market, export, and FDI are calculated






















































2.3 Conditions for Production, Export and FDI
Here, we consider the condition of domestic production, export, and FDI.
Suppose the zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity of industry i in country H is ϕ¤H
i .














I refer to the productivity level at which a ﬁrm’s proﬁt from exporting
is zero as “export cutoﬀ productivity,” and the productivity level at which
proﬁt from FDI is zero as “FDI cutoﬀ productivity.” Suppose the export


























8hold. From (14), with regard to arbitrary two productivities ϕ0 and ϕ”,

























That is, as the variable cost of exporting rises and the ratio of ﬁxed export
costs to ﬁxed production costs increases, export cutoﬀ productivity increases
compared to zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity. Examining the relationship be-
tween domestic and foreign markets, the larger ratio of the domestic price
level P H
i to the foreign price level P F
i , and the larger ratio of the domestic to-
tal wage RH to the foreign total wage RF raise the export cutoﬀ productivity
to zero-proﬁt productivity.

















































This equation shows the same relationship between relative price and market
size as equation (20). Additionally, when the cost of FDI increases relative
to the cost of exporting, the FDI cutoﬀ productivity increases relative to
zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity. 18
18From equation (21), we can indicate the following points.
With regard to the eﬀect of market size of two countries on FDI, even in case that the
diﬀerential of two countries’ market size (the total wages, RH and RF) is quite large,
there are FDI ﬁrms in both countries unless θH
i is inﬁnite. In this regard, our model is
closer to the actual tendency of FDI between developed and developing countries than
the horizontal FDI model in which FDI might not be seen when economic sizes of two
countries are quite diﬀerent.
With regard to the industry (or industries) where FDI can be seen, it is clear that some
ﬁrms in the comparatively advantage and disadvantaged industry in both countries also
enter the foreign market via FDI unless θH
i is inﬁnite because equation (21) holds in both
industries. To this extent, our model is closer to the actual tendency of FDI between
developed and developing countries than the vertical FDI model in which FDI cannot be
seen only in comparative advantage industry in one country.
92.4 Free Entry Condition
A ﬁrm decides to enter an industry by comparing the expected proﬁts and
costs of entering the market. I assume that ﬁrms exit the industry at a





















































































































































































10are the average proﬁt from domestic sales, export and FDI, respectively.
If the expected proﬁt continues to exceed entry cost, ﬁrms continue to
























This is the free entry condition.
2.5 Equilibrium Condition
In equilibrium, the sales revenue of goods is equal to consumners’ expense













































i is the number of ﬁrms that entered industry i.































After FDI is allowed, foreign ﬁrms also employ workers in the foreign























i are skilled and unskilled labor employed by domestic ﬁrms,
and SH
ia and LH







































11holds by cost minimization.































i + (fi + fai)
]
(36)





















holds. This is the whole model. 19
3 Characteristics of the Equilibrium
We cannot have a closed-form in this model. Therefore, I demonstrate a
numerical example in the next section. However before doing so, I reveal a
few characteristics of the equilibrium of the model.
We assume that the FDI cutoﬀ productivity ϕ¤H
ia exceeds zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ
productivity ϕ¤H
i . 20 Then ﬁrms with productivity exceeding ϕ¤H
ia enter the
foreign market via FDI. Regarding the relationship between ϕ¤H
ia and ϕ¤H
ix ,
we can put forth the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Other things being equal, the relationship between ϕ¤H
ix and
ϕ¤H
ia is decided by (a) export variable cost τi, (b) the diﬀerence between ﬁxed
cost of FDI and export fF
i + fH
ai − fH
ix, and (c) the wage diﬀerential of both
countries. The larger τi, the smaller fF
i + fH
ai − fH
ix is and the larger wage
diﬀerence, the smaller is ϕ¤H
ia compared to ϕ¤H
ix .
19The number of ﬁrms which enter an industry is decided to keep the total number of
ﬁrms constant. Let MH
ei be the number of ﬁrms to enter into industry i. As ﬁrms exit the











L )1−βi is equal to the industrial
total proﬁt because of (30), and the amount of the total industrial revenue RH
i deducted
by proﬁt is equal to the payment to labor in the production sector.
20When ϕ∗H
ia is below ϕ∗H
i , all ﬁrms that enter an industry enter foreign markets by
FDI. However we do not consider such a case because it is quite diﬀerent from the results
of empirical research.
12Proposition 1 is clear from the comparison of ΛH
i and θH
i . That is, if the
cost of FDI is less than the cost of exporting, more ﬁrms prefer FDI over
exporting. ϕ¤H
ix > ϕ¤H
ia might hold. 21
Next, regarding industrial zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity and average pro-
ductivity, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 If FDI is allowed under the condition in which costly export
is possible, the zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity and average productivity rise in
each industry. 22
In both industries, FDI raises the expected revenue from entering the
foreign market. Therefore, more ﬁrms enter the foreign market, and compe-
tition intensiﬁes. More intense competition forces low-productivity ﬁrms to
exit the market, and both zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity and average pro-
ductivity rise.
Let us compare industrial shares of FDI ﬁrms. We can see which industry
has the larger share by looking at the value of θH
1 /θH
2 . Under free trade, it

























holds. If the coeﬃcients of production, consumption, FDI ﬁxed cost, and
export variable cost are the same in both countries, the right-hand side of
(38) is decided by σ. Under a normal situation in which σ is from 3 to 4, the
value exceeds 1 (Figure 2). Under costly trade, θH
1 /θH
2 is aﬀected by the ratio
of prices of each good between the two countries. But if the price diﬀerence
is small, it converges between the free trade economy and autarky, greater
than 1. That is, the share of FDI ﬁrms in the comparatively disadvantaged
industry is larger than that of the comparatively advantaged industry.
In addition, we can point out the following proposition from this equation:
Proposition 3 When prices are given, θH
1 /θH
2 converges to 1 if
(a) The export variable cost τi is smaller.
(b) The diﬀerence of skilled labor intensity (β1 − β2) is smaller.
21In this case, by deﬁnition of ϕ∗H
ia , all ﬁrms with higher productivity than ϕ∗H
ia enter
into the foreign market by FDI and no ﬁrm chooses export. But this is also quite a
departure from the result of empirical research.
22The proof of this property is the same as for Proposition 4. of Bernard et al. (2007).
13(c) The diﬀerence of ratio of factor endowments is smaller (SLFH con-
verges to 1).
This proposition means that (a) even in a comparatively advantaged industry,
ﬁrms have an incentive to invest in the foreign country when the variable cost
of exporting is high, and (b) if the factor endowments and technology of both
countries become similar, ﬁrms in both industries will make similar choices
regarding FDI and exporting.
In the costly trade model of Bernard et al. (2007), the increment of
the zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity of a comparatively advantaged industry





1 ) , and the average productivity of a comparatively
advantaged industry increases than that of comparatively disadvantaged in-
dustry. Such results are proved under the condition that there is no FDI. In
this paper, the same results do not necessarily hold, as we see in the next
section.
4 Numerical Solutions
As Bernard et al. (2007) show, we cannot have a closed-form solution in
a two-good and two-factor model of ﬁrm heterogeneity with costly trade.
Therefore, they show numerical solutions by simulation. 23 As they did, I
show the results of numerical solutions because the model in this paper is
more complex than them.
4.1 Parameters
In my simulation, the benchmark is Bernard et al. (2007). Therefore, I set
the parameters as they did.
The distribution of ﬁrms’ productivity ϕi follows a Pareto distribution,
which is standard in the ﬁrm heterogeneity models. That is, the distribution
function G(ϕi) and density function dG(ϕi) are deﬁned as follows:








23In horizontal FDI models, numerical solutions are often used as in Markusen and
Venables (1998) and Markusen(2002).
14b(> 0) and k(> 0) are parameters. k indicates the lowest productivity among
entering ﬁrms. Here, I set b = 3.4, k = 0.2. Regarding consumption, suppose
σ is 3.8 (standard) and the parameters of consumption function are α1 =
α2 = 0.5. Cost parameters of export and FDI are set as fei = 2, fi = 0.1,
and fix = 0.1. The new parameter included in this study, fia, is set as 0.5.
The exit probability of ﬁrm, δ, is 0.025. These parameters are the same in
both countries.
As for factor endowments, suppose that ¯ SH = 1200, ¯ LH = 1000, ¯ SF =
1000 and ¯ LF = 1200. I assume that the endowment of each factor diﬀers
between two countries but the ratio of the relatively abundant factor to the
scarce factor is the same. Factor intensity for each industry is set as β1 = 0.6
and β2 = 0.4.
I also change the value of variable trade cost τi from 1.2 to 2.0 and we
can see the eﬀect when trade cost decreases.
I set wages symmetrically, as per Bernard et al. (2007). This indicates
that wages of skilled labor in the home country wH
S are the same as wages of




I performed simulations under these parameters and found solutions by
using Dynare. 24
4.2 Entry and Access to foreign market
First, I look at the entry to industry by ﬁrms and access to foreign market.
The FDI cutoﬀ productivity of the comparatively disadvantaged industry
exceeds that of the comparatively advantaged industry because price levels
do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the two countries, as seen in the preceding
section (Figure 3). 25
Export cutoﬀ productivity of the comparatively advantaged industry is
higher than that of the comparatively disadvantaged industry when the de-
gree of trade liberalization τi is high (for example, in the case of low tariﬀ
rates) (Figure 4). This phenomenon, not compatible with the Hecksher-Ohlin
model, arises as follows.
24Dynare is a program for analyzing dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
Our model is not dynamic, but we can have steady state values of our nonlinear equation
system by using Dynare.
25The variables of the comparatively advantaged (disadvantaged) industry in country H
are almost the same as those of the comparatively advantaged (disadvantaged) industry
in country F. Hence, I explain the result of country H only. BK refers to the result of my
benchmark, Bernard et al. (2007).
15As we have seen, the comparatively disadvantaged industry prefers FDI
and the comparatively advantaged industry prefers to export. As trade is
liberalized, ﬁrms in the comparatively advantaged industry attempt to shift
from FDI to exporting. Firms in the comparatively disadvantaged indus-
try attempt the same maneuver, but less earnestly. The increase of export
ﬁrms in the comparatively advantaged industry has numerous lowering ef-
fects on the price of comparatively disadvantaged industry in the importing
country. 26 Hence, in the importing country, the relative price ratio of the
comparatively advantaged industry increases and that of the comparatively
disadvantaged industry decreases. As a result, the export cutoﬀ productivity
of the comparatively advantaged industry exceeds that of the comparatively
disadvantaged industry.
Zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ productivity of the comparatively disadvantaged indus-
try also exceeds that of the comparatively advantaged industry when trade
is liberal because the increase in imports intensiﬁes competition. There is no
wonder that the expected revenue of each industry increases, compared to
the Bernard-Redding-Schott Benchmark, because of FDI.
4.3 Price index and real factor price
Compared to the Bernard-Redding-Schott Benchmark case, price indexes of
each industry P H
1 and P H
2 decrease because FDI intensiﬁes competition. The
noteworthy points are (a) P H
2 is lower than P H
1 when trade is highly liber-
alized, and (b) P H
1 declines as τi rises. The reason for (a) is the increased
imports by the comparatively disadvantaged industry (the comparatively ad-
vantaged industry in the foreign country). The reason for (b) is the behavior
of FDI ﬁrms. The explanation is as follows.
When trade is less liberal, both industries prefer FDI over exporting, but
the comparatively disadvantaged industry is more proﬁtable because it can
employ the abundant factor it uses intensively in production. Therefore,
FDI increases among ﬁrms in the comparatively disadvantaged industry and
drives down the price index of the comparatively advantaged industry in the
foreign country.
















26Price index is decided by (a) the number of domestic, export, and FDI ﬁrms and (b)
each average price of the these three categories of ﬁrms.
16increase more than in the benchmark case because FDI increases demand
for factors of production (Figure 7). It is diﬀerent from the benchmark
that the wage of unskilled labor increases as the degree of trade freedom
diminishes. This is because less liberal trade prompts more ﬁrms in the
comparatively advantaged industry (comparative disadvantaged industry in
foreign country) to prefer FDI.
4.4 Number of Firms
Greater competition by FDI lowers the number of ﬁrms compared to the
benchmark case (Figure 8). The decrease of ﬁrms in the comparatively dis-
advantaged industry is obvious. Therefore, the number of exporting ﬁrms and
FDI ﬁrms in the comparatively advantaged industry exceeds that of the com-
paratively disadvantaged industry regardless of the degree of liberal trade.
Note that (a) the number of entry ﬁrms decreases in both industries, and (b)
the number of ﬁrms in the comparatively advantaged industry is larger than
that in the comparatively disadvantaged industry. These situations are the
same as the Bernard-Redding-Schott Bbenchmark.
On the one hand, as trade is liberalized, the number of exporting ﬁrms
increases because export cutoﬀ productivity decreases. On the other hand,
the number of FDI ﬁrms decreases because of the increase in FDI cutoﬀ
productivity.
4.5 Employment
The trend of employment is the same as the benchmark case. We see an
increase in employment for the comparatively advantaged industry and a
decrease for the comparatively disadvantaged industry (Figure 9).
Looking at the composition of employment by domestic ﬁrms and FDI
foreign ﬁrms, FDI ﬁrms in both industries reduce employment but FDI ﬁrms
in the comparatively advantaged industry reduces less. The diﬀerence is
explained by the diﬀerent tendencies toward FDI in both industries.
Domestic ﬁrms in the comparatively advantaged industry increase em-
ployment as trade is liberalized. Domestic ﬁrms in the comparatively disad-
vantaged industry can also increase employment because FDI ﬁrms reduce
their workforces, mainly less abundant unskilled workers in the country.
174.6 Industrial real revenue and Welfare









increases because it expands exports after trade is liberalized (Figure 10).
Real revenue is higher than the benchmark case because revenue per ﬁrm
increases as the number of ﬁrms decreases.
By contrast, we cannot posit a simple relationship between the real rev-
enue of the comparatively disadvantaged industry and trade liberalization.
Intensiﬁed competition from FDI prompts more ﬁrms to exit the industry, de-
pressing real revenue. But the decrease in export cut-oﬀ productivity greater
than the comparatively advantaged industry makes the number of export
ﬁrms increase. In our numerical example, the latter eﬀect, coupled with the
eﬀect of a decreased price level, exceeds the former eﬀect.







1. 27 We can conﬁrm that FDI increases welfare in
our case (Figure 11).
5 Conclusion
In this study, I have expanded a recently-developed ﬁrm heterogeneity model
into a two-goods two-factor model and introduced FDI in the model. Then I
analyzed the tendencies of industries to choose exporting or FDI and analyzed
the eﬀect of FDI on the economy through numerical examples.
The model demonstrates that highly productive ﬁrms tend to prefer FDI
whether they are in an industry that employs an abundant factor of produc-
tion intensively or in an industry that employs a scarcer factor intensively.
This is the outcome that earlier vertical and horizontal FDI models cannot
explain well. In addition, the model demonstrates that ﬁrms in the former
industrial category are more likely to choose FDI, and this result reﬂects
the actual preference of Japanese ﬁrms when building businesses in emerging
economies.
According to results demonstrated by the model, FDI increases compe-
tition among ﬁrms and raises the real wage and welfare of both countries.
27This relationship is introduced from the utility maximization condition. The sum of
both industries’ revenue, RH
1 +RH




2 at α : 1−α, and
we can have the equation by substituting the relationship.
18On the whole, it is desirable to facilitate FDI, but doing so also has negative
consequences; increased competition forces low-productivity ﬁrms to exit the
market, and the number of ﬁrms decreases.
The industry that employs the relatively abundant factor of production
intensively has greater ﬂexibility in choosing exporting or FDI. As expected,
ﬁrms in such an industry export when trade conditions are liberal, and they
access foreign markets via FDI when conditions are restrictive. In contrast,
ﬁrms in the industry employing the scarcer factor intensively are locked into
FDI because conditions do not favor export. However, these ﬁrms can make
use of the more abundant factor of production available in the foreign econ-
omy.
The diﬀerence in tendencies of industries to choose exporting or FDI af-
fects the industries’ revenue. If trade is liberal, the industry employing the
more abundant factor intensively prefers export over FDI, and the industry’s
real revenue increases. The other industry also shifts from FDI to exporting,
but less intently. However, the increase in number of exporting ﬁrms raises
the industry’s real revenue. The increase of real revenue in the industry em-
ploying the scarcer factor intensively diﬀers markedly from results suggested
by the models of Heckscher-Ohlin and Bernard et al. (2007).
FDI by Japanese manufacturers in emerging economies has been active
across sectors. According to results of this study, it is rational for high-
productivity ﬁrms to invest in emerging economies with lower wages, even if
those ﬁrms employ unskilled labor intensively. In addition, the level of trade
restrictions in emerging economies is greater than that in advanced countries,
making it more eﬀective for Japanese ﬁrms to use FDI that to export.
Numerous policy implications emerge from this research. In particular,
it is important for policymakers to liberalize not only trade but also FDI. In
Japan’s case, trade liberalization beneﬁts industries employing skilled labor
and hinders industries employing unskilled labor. Improving opportunities
for FDI could reduce the impact on the latter even though the exit of low-
productivity ﬁrms is inevitable. Many emerging economies restrict foreign
investment to protect their domestic industries. Japan should appeal to their
governments to ease FDI restrictions, especially for industries that employ
more unskilled workers.
From the viewpoint of promoting Japanese FDI, it is import to facilitate
FDI by ﬁrms in industries reliant on unskilled labor. Sales by Japanese for-
eign aﬃliates are nearly three times larger than exports by Japanese ﬁrms.
But as recent empirical research reveals, FDI is common only among a few
19large, highly productive ﬁrms. Since the cost of entering foreign markets af-
fects the choice of FDI, policies to reduce this cost are essential for promoting
FDI by ﬁrms lacking information about foreign markets. Such policies in-
clude assisting with information about foreign markets and foreign countries’
policies toward FDI and business risk.
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